ABSTRACT

Economic voting is a phenomenon that political scientists and economists can hardly overlook. There is ample evidence for a strong link between economic conditions and government popularity. However, not everything is that simple and this edited collection focuses on 'the comparative puzzle' of economic voting.
Economic Voting emphasises the importance of comparative research design and argues that the psychology of the economic voter model needs to be developed further.

chapter |14 pages

The context of economic voting

An introduction

part |121 pages

Political institutions and economic voting

chapter |28 pages

The cost of ruling

A foundation stone for two theories

chapter |21 pages

The economy as context

Indirect links between the economy and voters

chapter |29 pages

Group economic voting

A comparison of the Netherlands and Germany

chapter |16 pages

On a short leash

Term limits and the economic voter

part |95 pages

Voter heterogeneity and economic voting

chapter |27 pages

Economic voting in subnational government

Catalonian evidence

chapter |32 pages

Temporal variations in economic voting

A comparative cross-national analysis

part |78 pages

The changing economic voter

chapter |23 pages

From class voting to economic voting

Patterns of individualization of electoral behavior in Italy, 1972–1996

chapter |8 pages

Conclusions